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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the ability of U.S. investors to allocate their foreign equity portfolios across 44
countries over a 25-year period. We find that U.S. portfolios achieved a significantly higher Sharpe
ratio than foreign benchmarks, especially since 1990. We test whether this strong performance owed
to trading expertise or longer-term allocation expertise. The evidence is overwhelmingly against
trading expertise. While U.S. investors did abstain from momentum trading and instead sold past
winners, we find no evidence that these past winners subsequently underperformed. In addition,
conditional  performance  measures,  which  directly  test  reallocating  into  (out  of)  markets  that
subsequently outperformed (underperformed), suggest no significant trading expertise. In contrast,
we offer strong evidence of longer-term allocation expertise: If we fix portfolio weights at the end






warnockf@darden.virginia.edu1 For example, Stulz (2005) shows that, relative to GDP, U.S. cross-border trading increased
sixty-fold from 1977 to 2002, far outstripping the twelve-fold increase in NYSE trading volume.
2 Bange, Khang, and Miller (2003) find little evidence of conditional skill in investment houses’
portfolio recommendations across 6 markets, while Glassman and Riddick (2006) find evidence of skill in
1.  Introduction
The performance literature is vast and spans several decades.  Many researchers have
evaluated the performance of recommendations, either by specific investment advisors (e.g., the
Black (1971) and Copeland and Mayers (1982) studies of Value Line recommendations) or by a
wide range of newsletters (Graham and Harvey, 1996; Metrick, 1999).  The literature on mutual
fund performance blossomed in the 1960s (Sharpe, 1966; Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Jensen, 1969)
and has yet to slow (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Becker,
Ferson, Myers, and Schill, 1999).  The performance of other types of investors, including pension
funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Ferson and Khang, 2002), retail investors (Barber
and Odean, 2000), and insiders (Eckbo and Smith, 1999), has also been thoroughly documented.
All of these studies, and the many others that they cite, share a common theme: They analyze the
performance of domestic investors’ domestic portfolios.
In contrast, the literature on the performance of international investors’ portfolios is sparse,
even though cross-border trading has skyrocketed in the past few decades.
1  The most prominent
published study (Cumby and Glen, 1990) finds that mutual funds performed poorly in 14 foreign
markets, although not in a statistically significant sense.  Two other studies in this relatively
underdeveloped literature focus on the performance of U.K. fund managers: Shukla and van
Inwegen (1995) find that their U.S. equity portfolios underperform domestic ones, while Blake and
Timmermann (2004) expand the destination markets to four major regions and find similarly poor
performance.  Another literature that is tangentially related to performance includes studies of the
relationship between international capital flows and returns (e.g., Bohn and Tesar, 1996).
2U.S. equity fund managers’ allocations among 4 markets in the late 1980s. Bekaert and Harvey (2003)
include a table on U.S. (unconditional) performance in emerging markets, but use cumulated flows data,
which as we show below can be very inaccurate. The related (and larger) literature on the relationship
between international flows and returns— for recent examples, see Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes
(2001), Griffin, Nadari, and Stulz (2004), and references therein—does not speak directly to portfolio
performance.  For example, if flows into all markets are positive and identical and all markets
subsequently have positive returns, one would find a positive relationship between flows and returns in
each market.  This would not necessarily be evidence of superior performance if returns in some markets
increase much more than those of other markets.  Superior performance in this case would entail an
increase in the weight of countries in which returns increase more and a decline in the weight of countries
with smaller increases in returns.
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In this paper we aim to fill the void in the international performance literature by evaluating
the country-allocation ability of the largest group of international equity investors in the world, U.S.
investors, over a 25-year period.  By the end of our sample, these investors had a foreign equity
portfolio of nearly $2 trillion, which represents roughly half the holdings of all foreign investors in
non-U.S. markets.  Our analysis of the performance and trading strategy of such a large group of
international investors adds not only to the performance literature but can also shed light on other
subjects, such as the home bias in equity holdings and the role of global investors in foreign equity
markets.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that compared to global benchmarks U.S. investors’ foreign
equity portfolios earned substantially higher Sharpe ratios.  This strong (unconditional) performance
is particularly evident since 1990 and occurs in both emerging and developed markets.  We
hypothesize that the strong performance could owe to one or both of two potential reasons: trading
expertise or longer-term allocation expertise.  That is, one can beat a benchmark in two ways, by
skillfully trading from period to period (trading expertise) or by selecting “better” portfolio weights
(allocation expertise).  
Utilizing three approaches, we find no evidence that trading expertise is behind the strong
performance.  First, because foreigners’ penchant for momentum trading has been shown to  hamper3
their performance (Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005), we characterize the trading strategy employed by
U.S. investors.  This characterization—implemented using the Badrinath and Wahal (2002) and
Ferson and Khang (2002) refinement of the Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995)
methodology—is important in its own right, as it is the first time that U.S. investors’ international
trading strategy has been analyzed and it produces an interesting result.  We often think that
investors use momentum trading strategies in their foreign portfolios (Brennan and Cao, 1997), but
we find no evidence of momentum trading.  Rather, we find strong evidence that U.S. investors can
be characterized as contrarian, especially when selling.  This strategy of selling past winners is
apparent in both developed and emerging markets.  However, while U.S. investors did abstain from
momentum trading and instead sold past winners, we find no evidence that these past winners
subsequently underperformed, so we cannot conclude that this trading strategy led to strong
performance.  
Our second piece of evidence against trading expertise as a driver of superior performance
is more direct.  Conditional performance measures are designed to test statistically whether investors
reallocated into (out of) markets that subsequently outperformed (underperformed).  We utilize both
the conditional returns-based and the conditional weight-based performance measures of Grinblatt
and Titman (1993), Eckbo and Smith (1998), and Ferson and Khang (2002).  Neither provide
evidence of superior skill in reallocating toward future winners.  
Finally, if we impose poor trading skill by constraining U.S. investors to transact at the worst
(closing) prices each month—purchasing only at the highest closing price within the month and
selling only at the lowest closing price—we still find strong performance.  This also suggests that
the strong performance we document is not the product of skillful trading.3 Fixed portfolio weights allow for trading, but only to rebalance to maintain the initial weights.
To ensure that this result does not owe to a quirk in the December 1989 allocations, we recalculated
allowing our investors to reallocate once (in December 1995).  The results are very similar.
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While we conclude that trading skill was not the source of the strong performance, we do
find evidence supporting longer-term allocation expertise.  If we fix portfolio weights at their end-
1989 allocations and do not allow any reallocations over the subsequent twelve years, we still find
superior performance.
3  That is, longer-term deviations from benchmark weights—not period-to-
period trading—appear to be behind the strong performance.
Could U.S. investors had known ex ante that their 1989 allocations would lead to the superior
performance?  We provide evidence that initial deviations from benchmark weights owed to cross-
country variations in insider ownership.  Insider ownership, an optimal response to cross-country
variations in governance and the protection of dispersed shareholders (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock,
2006), can be considered a proxy for (poor) corporate governance.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) show that portfolios of better governed firms had higher returns over the course of the 1990s,
but there is no theory that predicts that better governed firms must have higher returns over the
medium- to long-run, and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) argue that weak governance does not
cause poor future returns.  Thus, while U.S. deviations from benchmark weights owed to variations
in insider ownership (and hence governance) and poor governance is in some samples associated
with poor future returns, we are uncomfortable claiming that U.S. investors knew ex ante that their
strategy would lead to superior performance.
The main reason that the literature on international portfolio performance is relatively
underdeveloped is that the data are difficult to obtain.  Another important contribution of our paper
is the formation of U.S. investors’ monthly holdings in 44 equity markets for the period from
December 1976 to December 2003.  The bilateral holdings data provide the country weights in U.S.4 The assumption that U.S. investors hold the “market” within foreign countries is borne out of
necessity but reasonable.  Using U.S. benchmark survey data from December 1997, Edison and Warnock
(2004) and Ammer et al. (2004) find that U.S. investors tend to hold foreign equities that are large and
liquid, the same types of stocks that are included in the MSCI index.  Moreover, in the Ammer et al.
sample of over 12,000 non-U.S. firms, 78 percent of U.S. investors’ holdings were in MSCI firms, and
the correlation between firm-weights in the MSCI World (excluding the United States) and firm-weights
in U.S. investors’ foreign portfolios was 0.77.  The assumption does, however, have the important
implication that our study evaluates country-picking ability, not stock selection within markets. 
Moreover, because our focus is on unhedged returns, which are comprised of two components (equity
returns and changes in currency cross-rates), strictly speaking our study concerns the ability to pick equity
markets and foreign currencies.
5 Our holdings data are posted at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/817/default.htm.
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investors’ portfolios; armed with these weights, and assuming that within each country the market
is held, we are able to compute the (unhedged) foreign returns earned by U.S. investors.
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Our paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we present monthly estimates of U.S.
investors’ equity portfolios in over 40 countries over a 27-year period.  In Section 3 we analyze the
unconditional performance of U.S. investors’ portfolio of foreign equities.  In Section 4 we ascertain
whether the superior unconditional performance owed to trading or allocation expertise.  In Section
5 we explore the role of insider holdings and corporate governance in U.S. investors’ long-term
allocations and the strong portfolio performance.  In Section 6 we present concluding remarks and
discuss the possible implications of our results for the home bias in international portfolios.  Details
on the methodologies used to form portfolio weights, characterize trading strategies, and evaluate
conditional performance are included in appendices.
2.  U.S. Investors’ International Equity Portfolios 
We use publicly available data to create monthly estimates of U.S. investors’ holdings of
equities in 44 countries for the period from December 1976 to December 2003.
5  The underlying
data and the methodology are discussed in detail in Appendix A.  Briefly, our methodology involves
adding capital flows and valuation adjustments to a past known holdings amount (from an infrequent6 The benchmark survey data collection procedure–the large custodians who report the majority
of the data do not always distinguish between types of U.S. investors–makes it impossible to identify the
ultimate U.S. investor with precision.  That said, the typical U.S. investor who invests in foreign
securities is likely an institution.  In the 1997 survey, the type of U.S. investor was denoted for $667
billion of the reported $1208 billion in U.S. holdings of foreign equities.  Of the $667 billion in holdings,
93 percent was held by mutual funds or pension funds.
7 These country-level discrepancies are exactly the reason that cumulated flows should not be
used for performance analysis.
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benchmark survey) to form naive baseline estimates.
6  These naive estimates, as we show below, are
in many cases inaccurate, primarily because of the financial center bias in the capital flows data
(Warnock and Cleaver, 2003).  The benchmark survey data do not suffer from this bias, so we then
adjust the capital flows to ensure that our holdings estimates are consistent with the next known
holdings amount (from the next benchmark survey); the resulting holdings data are our benchmark-
consistent holdings estimates.  For selected countries, our naive (thin lines) and benchmark-
consistent (thick lines) holdings estimates are depicted in Figures 1(a) - 1(g) for the period January
1977 – December 2003, with benchmark survey dates shown as the vertical lines at March 1994,
December 1997, and December 2001.  Estimates that postdate the last benchmark survey should be
viewed as preliminary and are subject to substantial revisions after a new benchmark becomes
available; accordingly, they will not be utilized in our performance analysis.
As shown in Figure 1a, naive estimates understated U.S. positions in foreign equities as of
the 1994 and 1997 benchmarks by 36 and 20 percent, respectively.  These discrepancies can mask
large, offsetting errors in bilateral positions.  For example, as of end-2001 the naive estimate of
holdings of U.K. equities (Figure 1c) was 18 percent too low while the estimate of holdings of
Canadian equities (Figure 1d) was 34 percent too high.
7  From this point on we discard the naive
estimates and proceed to analyze the benchmark-consistent estimates.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of regional weights in U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolios.8 In a sense, we are viewing U.S. investors’ global portfolio allocations as the outcome of two
steps: a decision to allocate between domestic and foreign equities and a decision to allocate among
foreign equities.  The focus of this paper is on the second step. By focusing on the foreign portfolio we
are not allowing for the fact that investment in certain countries could be useful for hedging against
positions in U.S. equity markets. Because our holdings estimates that postdate the last benchmark asset
survey are subject to substantial revisions, for all of the performance analysis in this paper we end the
sample at December 2001.
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The country composition of each region, as well as country weights for selected years, is provided
in Table 1.  The figure shows that over the past few decades euro area countries have seen increased
weights in U.S. portfolios at the expense of “Other Developing” (mostly Japan).  Emerging markets
as a group have not increased as a portion of U.S. portfolios.  Table 1 also includes the composition
of a benchmark portfolio, the MSCI World (excluding the United States), for year end 1989, 1996,
and 2001.  U.S. investors were roughly in line with the benchmark allocations for developed and
emerging markets, but within these groups there were sizeable deviations from benchmark
weightings.  It is the evolution of these deviations that form the basis of our performance analysis.
3. Performance Analysis of Foreign Equity Portfolios
We test the unconditional performance of U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolios by asking
the simple question: Did U.S. investors choose the right markets when venturing abroad?
8  To gauge
this we compare returns of the foreign portfolio of U.S. investors—the composition of which
changes month-to-month—to returns of value-weighted benchmark portfolios.  Not having time-
series data on security-level holdings within countries, we perform our analysis at the country level
and implicitly assume that the composition of U.S. investors’ holdings in each country is similar to
the composition of the country’s MSCI index.  As noted in the introduction, this assumption—
imposed out of necessity—is not invalid, as the correlation between firm-level weights in the MSCI9 Throughout this paper we do apples-to-apples comparisons.  For example, before the late 1980s,
emerging markets were not included in MSCI indexes; thus, throughout the paper we use only developed
countries in our 1977-1989 analysis.  For 1990-2001, we include all 44 countries listed in Table 1. 
Specifically, our value-weighted benchmark is a combination of the MSCI World index excluding the
United States for the sample from January 1977 through December 1989 and a value-weighted across 44
countries used in our sample for the sample from January 1990 through December 2001.  MSCI World
index excluding the United States consists of 22 developed markets, all of the developed countries in our
sample plus New Zealand.  Ideally, we would like to use value-weighted portfolio for 44 countries for the
whole sample; however, country-level MSCI market capitalization data are only available from December
1989.  To always do apples-to-apples comparisons, when evaluating portfolio performance we restrict
U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings to contain only developed markets prior to 1990, assuming no holdings
of emerging market equities before December 1989.  Because emerging markets are small relative to
developed ones, this restriction does not influence any of our conclusions.
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index and in U.S. investors’ portfolios is quite high (0.77), but it does imply that we are not
evaluating within country stock-picking ability, but rather skill in cross-country allocations.
Our unconditional performance analysis (Table 2) provides evidence that, within their
foreign equity portfolios, U.S. investors exhibited skill in reallocating across markets, especially
after 1989.  This skill is not evident in a statistically significant sense over the full sample from 1977
to 2001 (Panel A); U.S. investors’ foreign portfolios earned a higher Sharpe ratio than the value-
weighted foreign benchmark (11.3% vs. 8.9%), but the difference is not statistically significant, as
the p-value of a χ
2 test of the difference in the Sharpe ratios is 0.142.
9  Splitting the sample (Panel
B) shows that the Sharpe ratios were nearly identical in the 1977 - 1989 period, but that in the 1990 -
2001 period U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolio produced a significantly higher Sharpe ratio
than the value-weighted benchmark.  This superior performance was obtained through much higher
average excess returns—positive 0.13 percent per month versus negative 0.11 percent—and less
volatility.
Panel C compares equity investment performance in different groups of countries.  Because
most emerging markets became important in global investment in the early 1990s—and because we
have more faith in our holdings estimates that are relatively close to benchmark surveys—we focus10 We do not show performance against equally weighted portfolios because this allocation is not
feasible.  In December 1997, U.S. investors’ foreign equity position was about $1.15 trillion, so equal
allocations across 44 countries would imply an investment of $26 billion in each country, which is greater
than the (MSCI) market capitalization of 16 countries in our sample.
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on the period from 1990 onward.  In each of the two country groups, we restrict the investment
strategy to contain only assets in that group and reweight the asset allocation within a group to sum
to one.  The results on investment in developed and emerging markets are qualitatively similar to
the aggregate results: Over this period U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolios produced
significantly higher Sharpe ratios than the value-weighted foreign portfolios.
10  We investigate next
whether this strong performance owes to trading expertise or longer-term allocation expertise.
4. Reasons for the Superior Unconditional Performance
U.S. investors earned higher Sharpe ratios than foreign benchmarks, especially since 1990.
This strong performance could owe to one (or both of) two potential reasons: trading expertise or
longer-term allocation expertise.  That is, in general one can beat a benchmark in one or both of the
following ways, by skillfully trading from period to period (trading expertise) or by selecting
“better” portfolio weights (allocation expertise). In this section we explore these potential reasons
for the superior (unconditional) performance.
4.1 Trading Expertise
We investigate whether trading expertise caused the superior performance in three ways.
We first characterize the trading strategy employed and ascertain whether that strategy was linked
to strong performance.  We then utilize direct tests by employing conditional performance measures.
Finally, we impose poor trading skill within each month.  11 A momentum investor buys past winners and sells past losers; a contrarian investor does the
opposite.
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4.1.1 Trading Strategy Employed
The standard presumption in the international finance literature is that investors are at an
informational disadvantage when they venture abroad.  This view is based in part on empirical
studies that have found that foreigners perform poorly when investing in countries ranging from
Indonesia (Dvorak, 2005) and Korea (Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2001) to Germany (Hau, 2001).  In the
theoretical model of Brennan and Cao (1997), the informational disadvantage results in returns-
chasing behavior, which Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) argue leads to poor portfolio performance.
Was the good performance we documented in spite of returns-chasing behavior, or did U.S.
investors follow another trading strategy?
We describe the trading strategy of U.S. investors using the Ferson and Khang (2002) and
Badrinath and Wahal (2002) refinement of the Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) methodology
(details are in Appendix B).  Briefly, the overall momentum statistic, LM, is intended to measure
the degree to which U.S. investors actively change their portfolio holdings in the direction of the
past k periods’ stock returns.  A significantly positive (negative) value of LM would constitute
evidence of a momentum (contrarian) trading strategy.
11  Because investors may exhibit different
styles when increasing and decreasing country weights—perhaps aggressively increasing the
weights on past winners while not showing evidence of any specific trading style when reducing
country weights—we also compute BM (Buy Only) and SM (Sell Only) statistics.  The BM statistic
will indicate whether momentum trading is evident when investors increase country weights; SM
applies when investors decrease country weights.12 That U.S. investors tended to sell past winners suggests that on average U.S. investors did not
exacerbate declines in foreign markets.  That is, we find no evidence of a tendency to sell the equities of
countries that recently suffered poor returns.
13 At first glance, our contrarian when selling results appear to contrast with Kaminsky, Lyons,
and Schmukler (2004), who find that 13 Latin American mutual funds exhibit momentum trading over the
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Panel A of Table 3 shows results for the momentum measures using the past one-, two-, and
three-month returns for the full sample (from 1977) and two subsamples (1977–1989 and
1990–2001).  Only one of the nine LM (Buy and Sell) coefficients is significant, indicating that by
this metric when U.S. investors venture abroad their trading strategy cannot be characterized as
momentum following or contrarian.  When we focus on instances in which U.S. investors increased
the portfolio weight on country i (BM Buy Only), we again see very little evidence of momentum
trading; the coefficients on the BM statistic are usually positive, indicating that U.S. investors
moved into markets that recently performed well, but the statistic is almost never significant.  In
contrast, all of the SM (Sell Only) coefficients are negative and significant, indicating that U.S.
investors exhibit a contrarian strategy when selling; that is, they sell past winners.  
In Panel B, we separate trading in developed and emerging markets for the 1990–2001
period.  Again, the evidence points clearly to a tendency to sell past winners.  In both developed and
emerging markets, most of the SM (Sell Only) statistics are significant and all are negative.  As in
Panel A, evidence of momentum trading is scant: Of the 18 cells in Panel B, only one has a positive
and significant coefficient, the BM (Buy Only) at lag 1 for emerging markets.
12  
Our findings in this subsection are consistent with Badrinath and Wahal (2002), who find
that institutional investors follow a contrarian strategy in the U.S. market when liquidating or
adjusting existing positions.  Interestingly, they find that the effect is more pronounced in small and
volatile firms, which is consistent with our finding of stronger evidence of contrarian trading in
emerging markets (or that foreign stocks are viewed as being similar to small domestic stocks).
13 period from 1993 – 1999.   However, most of their evidence pertains to LM (Buy and Sell) at a zero lag;
we do not analyze  contemporaneous momentum statistics because it is impossible to disentangle truly
momentum trading (flows following price) from price pressure (price reacting to flows). Moreover, they
do not compute BM and SM statistics, so our studies are not directly comparable. 
14 Results are qualitatively similar when we normalize the co-variation of the change in portfolio
weight when selling and the previous month excess return (x-axis) with either the standard deviation of
the change in weight for each country or the mean of the weight for each country.
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Our results imply that the factor Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) highlight as a root cause of poor
performance of foreigners—returns-chasing behavior—does not appear to be evident in our sample.
But did the strategy of contrarian when selling lead to the strong performance that we
documented?  In Figure 3, we depict the relationship between U.S. investors’ selling behavior and
subsequent returns.  The x-axis shows the time-series average of the co-variation of the change in
portfolio weight when selling and the previous  month excess return.  This measure of co-variation
is similar to the Sell Only momentum statistic, except that it is shown country-by-country, not
summed over all countries.  The y-axis shows the time-series average of the next month’s return for
each country.  If markets recently downweighted by U.S. investors subsequently underperformed
(which could cause the superior performance), we would expect to see many observations in the
southwest quadrant.  The fact that there is no mass of observations in that quadrant suggests that
selling past winners did not produce the documented superior performance.
14  Of course, Figure 3
is not the perfect way to depict the relationship between trading strategy and performance.  Grinblatt
and Titman stress that the appropriate test (which we utilize) is not of individual country covariances
but rather of the sum of the covariances.  We turn next to an even more direct test.
4.1.2 Direct Tests of Trading Expertise and Superior Performance
U.S. investors’ portfolios earned higher Sharpe ratios than global benchmarks, but in the
previous subsection we found no evidence that their trading behavior (contrarian when selling) led
to that strong performance.  Conditional performance measures enable more direct tests of the link15 To capture the predictability of future returns, we use information variables that have been
found to have robust predictive power for aggregate country-level expected returns (Harvey, 1991; Ferson
and Harvey, 1993; and Bekaert and Harvey, 1997).  These information variables include lagged changes
in the short-term interest rate (U.S. Treasury three-month yield), lagged changes in term structure spread
(U.S. Treasury 10-year yield minus U.S. Treasury 3-month yield), and lagged world excess returns. 
Consistent with the findings in Ang and Bekaert (2006) and Campbell and Yogo (2006), our
(untabulated) country-by-country regressions indicate that the interest rate variables have the most power
for predicting future returns.  We also experimented with a lagged default spread (Moody’s Baa minus
Aaa bond yields) and lagged local excess returns, but found that these variables have little predictive
power in most countries; including these two variables do not change our results.  We do not use the local
or global dividend yield.  Ferson, Sarkisssian, and Simin (2003) illustrate that returns prediction
regressions with persistent variables such as the dividend yield tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of
no predictability.  Moreover, Campbell and Yogo (2006), who account for this bias in a study of the U.S.
market, and Ang and Bekaert (2006) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003), who use Monte Carlo
simulations for a range of emerging and developed markets, find no predictive power for the dividend
yield.
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between trading expertise and strong performance by ascertaining whether U.S. investors move into
(out of) markets before returns are higher (lower) than anticipated from using publicly available
information.
15  If U.S. investors based their trading strategy solely on public information, the
conditional measures in this section will show no evidence of superior trading expertise.   
We use two types of conditional performance measures.  The first is a conditional
returns-based measure (CRM) that evaluates the conditional Jensen’s alpha—the abnormal returns
of U.S. investors’ portfolio over a benchmark factor model.  The second is a conditional weight-
based measure (CWM), which does not rely on an asset pricing model (Grinblatt and Titman,
1989,1993; Eckbo and Smith, 1998; and Ferson and Khang, 2002).  Complete details on both
measures are provided in Appendix C.
The basic intuition behind the CRM is to assume a conditional asset pricing model and
estimate it with an intercept term, the conditional Jensen’s alpha.  A significantly positive intercept
term would be evidence of superior performance that owed to private information about future
returns beyond what can be exploited from public information—superior trading expertise that could
explain the superior (unconditional) performance we have documented—whereas a portfolio16 In our asset pricing models, aggregate country-level equity indices of total (price and dividend)
returns and market capitalization in U.S. dollars are from MSCI.  The starting date for each country is
shown in Figure A1.  The world market portfolio return is a combination of the MSCI World index for
the sample from January 1977 through December 1989 and a value-weighted across 44 countries in our
sample for the sample from January 1990 through December 2001. See details in footnote 9. All excess
returns are computed over the one-month Eurodollar interest rate.  Results using a combination of the
MSCI World index for the period from January 1977 through December 1989 and the MSCI All Country
World index, which consists of 49 developed and emerging markets, for the period from January 1990
through December 2001 are very similar and are available on request.
17 Our two-factor model utilizes a combination of the MSCI World growth and value indices,
which include 23 developed markets, for the period from January 1977 through December 1996 and the 
MSCI All Country World growth and values indices, which include both developed and emerging
markets for 49 countries, for the period from January 1997 through December 2001.  The MSCI All
Country World growth and values indices only available from December 1996.
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strategy that relied only on public information would produce an insignificant intercept term, or zero
conditional Jensen’s alpha. 
The CRM requires a stand on an asset pricing model.  With no general consensus about the
“correct” international asset pricing model, we utilize three widely used models.  The first is the
conditional global version of the CAPM with the world market portfolio as a factor.
16  Second, as
Fama and French (1998) find that the one-factor world CAPM fails to explain the value premium
in the global equity markets (that is, average returns on a high book-to-market portfolio are higher
than average returns on a low book-to-market portfolio), we use a two-factor model that includes
the world market portfolio and the difference between returns on a global portfolio of high book-to-
market and low book-to-market firms (HML).
17  Lastly, Solnik (1974) and Adler and Dumas (1983)
illustrate that when purchasing power parity does not hold, in addition to the world market portfolio,
foreign exchange risk will be priced in financial markets.  We proxy for foreign exchange risk with
the excess returns from investing in foreign currencies.  In principal, we should include as many
currencies as we have different foreign assets.  However, for tractability reasons, we only use excess18 Table 3 of Thomas et al. (2004) presents results, including conditional Jensen’s alpha, of the
conditional pricing models for each country in our sample.  There is little if any evidence that our
conditional asset pricing models are not valid for this set of countries.
19 We estimate the model jointly but allow an estimate of Jensen’s alpha for each subsample.
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returns deposited in euro (Deutsche mark before January 1999), sterling, and yen; see, e.g., Dumas
and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gerard (1998).
18
   Table 4 reports estimates of the conditional Jensen’s alpha, αp, under the different factor
pricing model specifications and under both time-varying and constant betas.  Although we are
focusing on the period of superior unconditional performance from 1990 to 2001, for completeness
we also show estimates for the full sample ( Panel A).  In the left side of the panel, we use three
different factor pricing models and allow beta to be time-varying. For the full sample, the CRW
measure is positive but not significant, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
superior conditional performance.  The time-varying risk premium is an important factor in
explaining time-varying expected returns—the highly significant χ
2 test statistic indicates a strong
rejection of the null that the estimates in the vector γ in equation (C2), except the constant, are
jointly insignificant—but there is little evidence of time-varying betas, so in the right half of the
panel we use the same factor models but constrain beta to be constant.  The results, with positive but
insignificant Jensen’s alphas, are qualitatively similar to the results with time-varying betas.
Panel B investigates two subsamples, one pre-1990 and the other from 1990 to 2001.
19  For
both time-varying and constant betas, in neither period is the performance measure statistically
significant.  Panel C shows estimates of Jensen’s alpha for portfolios of developed and emerging
markets from 1990, re-weighting country weights in each portfolio to sum to one.  Again, we find
no evidence of superior conditional performance by U.S. investors in international equity markets;
Jensen’s alphas are generally negative for developed markets and positive for emerging markets, but16
insignificant throughout.  In all samples, we tested for and found little evidence of time-varying
betas, so we re-estimated constraining beta to be constant; the results are qualitatively similar.  
Overall, tests based on the CRM statistic provide no indication that U.S. investors’ superior
unconditional performance owed to trading expertise.  However, because the CRM is a joint test of
investor performance and the underlying assumed asset pricing model, we turn next to a portfolio
weight-based measure, originally proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), that does not rely
on an assumption about an asset pricing model. Grinblatt and Titman show in the case of constant
expected returns that an investor who has private information and uses that information to reallocate
his portfolio weight would generate a positive estimate of the sum of the covariances between
changes in portfolio weight and future abnormal returns, above a constant expected return, given a
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion preference as defined in Rubinstein (1973).  Such an investor
would move into a market when private information indicated positive future abnormal returns and
out of a market in which private information indicated negative future abnormal returns.  Eckbo and
Smith (1998) and Ferson and Khang (2002) extend this framework to allow for time-varying
expected returns.  Under time-varying expected returns, an investor would move into (out of) the
market when private information indicates a positive (negative) abnormal return—above an expected
return predicted from using public information.  In our context, evidence of trading expertise would
be a positive estimate of the sum of the conditional covariances between changes in portfolio weight
and future abnormal returns.
Table 5 shows estimates of the average conditional portfolio weight measure, φp, estimated
from the system of equations (C9) and (C10).  The top panel shows estimates of CWM for the full
sample period against one-, two-, and three-month benchmark buy-and-hold strategies (k=1, 2, 3,
respectively).  The CWM is always positive, but never significant.  That is, we find no evidence of17
superior conditional performance by U.S. investors, implying that U.S. investors do not have private
information about future returns above what is available publicly.  The results in the bottom panels
are qualitatively similar.  CWM is higher in the more recent period, but not significantly so; similar
to the results for the full sample, we find no evidence of superior conditional performance in the
early or more recent period (Panel B).  For portfolios of developed and emerging markets (Panel C)
from 1990, we again find no evidence of superior conditional performance.
In summary, the evidence in this subsection provides no indication that the strong
unconditional performance owes to expertise in period-to-period trading.
4.1.3 Imposing Trading at the Worst Prices
This subsection offers more evidence that trading expertise did not produce the strong
unconditional performance.  We constrain U.S. investors to trade at the worst prices of the month
by assuming that all purchases are made at the highest (daily closing) price of the month and that
all sales were conducted at the lowest price.  If U.S. investors are adept at intramonth trading, we
should expect to see a sharp degradation in performance.  In contrast, as a comparison of columns
(b) and (c) of Table 6 shows, imposing poor intramonth trading does little to affect performance.
This helps to make an important point: In our sample, portfolio performance owes very little to
period-to-period trading expertise, but instead is likely determined by skills in longer-term
allocations.  We address this more directly next.
4.2 Skill in Longer-term Allocations
The results in the previous section provide strong evidence against trading expertise as a
source for superior unconditional performance.  In this section we offer more direct evidence of
longer-term allocation expertise by imposing the restriction that U.S. investors must maintain20 The results are very similar when we allow for a reallocation in December 1995 by using the
December 1995 weights through December 2001.
21 If we omit Japan from our full sample, U.S. investors’ portfolios still significantly
outperformed the global benchmark.  If Japan is omitted from the developed country group, U.S. portfolio
performance in that group is only marginally stronger than a developed country market-capitalization-
weighted portfolio.
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constant country weights in their foreign equity portfolios.  That is, we fix the portfolio weights at
their end-1989 allocations and ascertain whether, even with this extreme restriction, U.S. investors
would have obtained strong results over the 1990–2001 period.  Note that fixed weights allows for
trading, but only to rebalance to maintain the initial allocations.
20
Column (d) of Table 6 provides strong evidence in support of longer-term allocation
expertise.  Even if we do not allow any reallocations, U.S. investors’ portfolios outperformed the
international benchmarks, both overall and in the emerging market and developed country splits.
Period-to-period trading does matter at the margin, as the mean returns are slightly higher in the
unrestricted portfolios, at least for developed countries.  But it is clear that the (significantly) strong
unconditional performance owed to long-standing differences between the country weights in U.S.
investors’ foreign equity portfolios and weights in global benchmarks.  
Figure 4 plots each countries reward-to-risk ratio over the 1990–2001 period against the
initial (end-1989) over- or underweigthing (i.e., the deviation from market-capitalization-weighted
allocations).  In each panel, there is a vertical line at the average reward-to-risk ratio.  Because
strong portfolio performance comes from substantially overweighting (underweighting) those
countries that had better (worse) than average subsequent performance, the figure provides a
graphical depiction of  which countries contributed most to the strong portfolio performance.  Panel
(a) shows that the underweighting of Japan played a large role in the strong performance, as did the
overweighting of the UK and the Netherlands.
21  Panel (b), restricted to developed countries, is19
similar to Panel (a) in that Japan, the UK, and the Netherlands play the largest roles.  In Panel (a)
emerging market countries are bunched around the x-axis—they are too small to have made much
of an impact on the overall foreign portfolio—but Panel (c), restricted to emerging markets, shows
that within the emerging market portfolio the strong performance came primarily from
overweighting Mexico and underweighting Korea and Taiwan.
In sum, we have shown in this section that the strong performance we document owes not
to trading expertise but rather to longer-term allocation expertise, and we have highlighted which
countries contributed most to the strong performance.  An interesting question is what actually
determined those end-1989 over- and underweightings.  We explore this next.
5.  Deviations from a Market-Cap-Weighted Portfolio in 1989 and Expected Returns
The optimal insider ownership theory of the home bias suggests that the over- or
underweighting of particular countries in U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolios should owe in
large part to cross-country differences in insider ownership (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock, 2006).
Specifically, in countries with poor institutions and poor protection of the rights of dispersed
shareholders, it is optimal for corporate insiders to amass substantial positions.  Not wanting to be
the source of private benefits of control, outside investors appropriately underweight such firms. 
Evidence of the link between insider ownership and portfolio allocations is provided at the
country level in Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2002) and Kho, Stulz, and Warnock
(2006) and at the firm level in Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2006).  With only few observations at the
end of 1989, statistical analysis is necessarily limited, but we do find that this relationship held in
1989.  The greater is insider ownership in a country, the greater U.S. investors underweight its
stocks.  Specifically, controlling for size, for the 30 countries that had data at the end of 1989 the22 We have 30 observations because 32 countries have MSCI weights at end-1989 and two of
those (Philippines and Ireland) do not have insider ownership or market capitalization data. The insider
ownership variable is as of 1994 from Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2006). To the extent that insider
ownership evolves slowly, this is a reasonable proxy for 1989 insider ownership, and is the best available
measure. In the regression, the p-value on the insider ownership coefficient is 0.059, which is reasonable
for a sample size of only 30 (results available from authors upon request).
23 To the extent that insider ownership is negatively related to the quality of corporate
governance, and poor governance countries are less transparent, this result is consistent with the evidence
in Gelos and Wei (2005) that in the late 1990s foreigners underweighted less transparent countries. 
24 A more exhaustive search of factors would only uncover the following: size (which we control
for), corporate governance (proxied for by insider ownership), and cross-listings. Because no emerging
market firm had cross-listed by 1989, we do not include a cross-listing variable. Ahearne et al. (2004)
show that international trade (and, hence, distance) plays no role in U.S. portfolio allocations across
countries.
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country-level deviations from MSCI weights are negatively related to the degree of insider
ownership.
22  Thus, as in Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2006), the evidence is suggestive that end-1989
U.S. portfolio weights were due to variations in insider ownership around the world.
23,24
Could U.S. investors have known ex ante that an allocation strategy based on insider
ownership would have led to the superior performance that we document?  Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003) show that portfolios of better governed firms had higher returns over the course of
the 1990s, but there is no theory that says that better governed firms must have higher returns over
the medium- to long-run, and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) argue that weak governance does not
cause poor future returns.  The Gompers et al. and Core et al. results are for the U.S., a country that
has strong investor protections; it could be that poor governance abroad is at times associated with
unexpected expropriation (Johnson,  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000).  Weighing the
evidence and theory, we can conclude only that U.S. deviations from benchmark weights owed to
variations in insider ownership (and hence governance), and that poor governance is in some
samples associated with poor future returns.  But we are uncomfortable claiming that U.S. investors
knew ex ante that their strategy would lead to superior performance.25 For models with barriers to international investment, see Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Merton
(1987),  and Gehrig (1993).
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6. Conclusion
We provide evidence that U.S. investors exhibited skill in choosing the country composition
within their foreign equity portfolios.  In particular, the Sharpe ratio on U.S. investors’ foreign
equity portfolio is significantly greater than that on foreign benchmarks, especially since 1990.
Subsequent analysis suggests that this superior (unconditional) skill owes not to any particular skill
in month-to-month trading, but to expertise in longer-term allocations. 
Another important contribution of this paper is the formation of monthly bilateral estimates
of U.S. investors’ holding of the equities of 44 foreign countries for the period from December 1976
to December 2003.  These holdings data should be useful for many other applications going forward.
For example, the monthly portfolio weights can be used to construct a portfolio-weighted exchange
rate index.  Another potential application is to use the monthly bilateral holdings data in empirical
models of exchange rate determination (Chinn et al., 2006).
Our results have implications for the home bias literature.  It is well known that foreign
securities have only a small weight in investors’ portfolios, but it is not known whether this weight
is inordinately small, in part because we have not had a clear picture of the returns investors earn
on their foreign portfolios.  If investors are at a severe informational disadvantage when they venture
abroad, the optimal weight on foreign securities would be far smaller than implied by standard
metrics.
25  One interpretation of the skill exhibited by U.S. investors that we document is that
information asymmetries are not severe: If investors are at a substantial disadvantage when they
venture abroad, it would be unlikely that U.S. investors could allocate across foreign markets in a
manner that would produce superior portfolio performance—even in an unconditional sense—over22
a full decade.  A competing interpretation, for which we find some supporting evidence, is that
information asymmetries may well be severe and U.S. investors performed well precisely by
investing in the types of countries (those with strong governance institutions) that have alleviated
barriers to international investors.23
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Appendix A.  Creating Monthly Bilateral Equity Positions
Data Requirements
To create monthly estimates of U.S. investors’ holdings of equities, we use data from
infrequent benchmark surveys as well as data on capital flows, valuation adjustments, transaction
costs, and merger-related stock swaps.
Bilateral capital flows.  U.S. residents’ foreign securities transactions have been reported monthly
since January 1977 to the Treasury International Capital Reporting System (TIC), mainly by brokers
and dealers.  For foreign long-term securities, these mandatory reports contain information on gross
purchases and gross sales (at market value); the country of the foreign counterparty to the
transaction; and that the foreign security was an equity.  For the purposes of estimating bilateral
positions, there is geographic bias in the TIC data because the data indicate the countries through
which U.S. residents purchase foreign securities, but not the residence of the issuer of the foreign
security.  It is commonly assumed that the transactor country is the same as the country in which the
security’s issuer is resident, but trades conducted through intermediaries in third countries, such as
the financial centers of the United Kingdom and the Caribbean, violate this assumption. The TIC
data are available at www.treas.gov/tic.
Benchmark asset surveys.  Data on U.S. holdings of foreign securities, available at
www.treas.gov/fpis, are collected in detailed but infrequent security-level benchmark asset surveys
conducted in March 1994, December 1997, and December 2001.
26  Reporting to the surveys is
mandatory, with penalties for noncompliance, and the data received are subjected to extensive
analysis and editing.  For asset surveys (of U.S. holdings of foreign securities), the reporters consist
mainly of large custodians and large institutional investors.  Holdings of U.S. private investors are
included to the extent they were through U.S. mutual funds or entrusted to U.S.-resident custodians
for safekeeping.  For our purposes, it is important to note that there is no geographical bias in the
asset survey data; security-level identifiers (e.g, ISIN or SEDOL) provide information on the
issuer’s country of residence and ensure that the country attribution of the data is accurate.
27
Valuation adjustments.  Data availability for foreign equity indexes are depicted in Figure A1.  We
use country-level MSCI  price return indexes, which are composed of large and liquid equities, the
type of equities typically held by international investors (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Edison and
Warnock, 2004; Ammer, Holland, Smith, and Warnock, 2004).  For most emerging markets, MSCI
equity data begin in December 1987; for these countries, prior to the MSCI starting date we rely on
S&P/IFC Global returns.
28 29 See www.elkins-mcsherry.com, Willoughby (1998), and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhaven
(2001) for discussions of the Elkins-McSherry data.  Lesmond (2002) studies transaction costs in
emerging equity markets, but to have one source for both emerging markets and devoloped countries, we
use Elkins-McSherry data.
30 In their presentation of U.S. capital flows data, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
includes estimates of stock swaps.  Aggregate stock swaps data are now posted on the TIC web site.  Our
data on bilateral stock swaps are from Security Data Corporation. 
29
Transaction costs.  The TIC data are reported gross at cost including commissions and taxes, so to
compute the value of securities bought or sold, an adjustment for transaction costs must be made.
For one-way transaction costs in equities, we use Elkins-McSherry estimates of commissions and
fees charged institutional investors.
29
Stock swaps. The TIC data do not include equities acquired through merger-related stock swaps.
For example, when a foreign company acquires a U.S. firm, one form of financing the deal is an
exchange of equity in which shareholders of the target (U.S.) firm are given stocks in the acquiring
(foreign) firm.  To continue with this example, if the acquisition of foreign stocks through swaps
results in a greater-than-desired weighting on foreign stocks in U.S. equity portfolios, U.S. residents
will sell foreign stocks to rebalance their portfolios, and such sales are reported to the TIC system.
Since the TIC system does not capture the initial acquisition, but should capture associated sales,
measures of stock swaps must be included in any analysis of asset holdings.
30  Stock swaps swelled
in importance in 1998 and 1999, when U.S. residents acquired over $100 billion each year in foreign




To form naive baseline estimates, we start from one benchmark survey amount and use the
Warnock and Cleaver (2003) methodology to form monthly estimates through the date of the next
benchmark survey.  End-of-month holdings are formed by adjusting the previous month’s holdings
for estimated price and exchange rate changes and adding the current month’s (transaction cost-
adjusted) net purchases and equities acquired through stock swaps.  Specifically, we use the
following formula to form naive estimates of U.S. investors’ holdings of country i’s equities at the
end of period t:
(A1)
where
nhi, t  naive estimates of U.S. holdings of country i’s equities at the end of month t 
ri, t  returns from period t-1 to t, computed from appropriate price indices
gpi, t gross purchases of country i’s equities by U.S. residents during month t
gsi, t gross sales of country i’s equities by U.S. residents during month t
tci a constant adjustment factor for transaction costs in country i
ssi, t country  i’s equities acquired by U.S. residents through stock swaps during month t31 Our results are robust to different starting values, such as zero or 1994 positions scaled by the
distribution of 1977 trading.  We cannot use BEA data on bilateral positions because it is limited to
selected countries for a limited number of years.  Annual BEA estimates of U.S. positions in foreign
securities, without country detail, is provided in Table 2 of Nguyen (2002).  In general, our aggregate
estimates are similar in spirit to BEA’s but will differ in all cases except when a benchmark survey was
conducted at the end of a year (1997 and 2001).
32 Another way to form estimates is to assume that there are errors in valuation adjustments. For
example, investors might beat the market by x percentage points per month or earn returns that are more
volatile than the market.
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The initial values of each nhi, holdings in country i as of December 1976, predate benchmark
surveys and must be estimated.  To do so we assume that the country distribution of holdings from
the first asset survey (1994) is the same as the country distribution in December 1976, and apply
those shares to aggregate end-1976 holdings as published by the BEA.
31
Benchmark-consistent estimates
Our benchmark-consistent estimates combine the naive baseline estimates with holdings
from the infrequent benchmark surveys.  For example, to form estimates for the April 1994 -
November 1997 inter-survey period, we start from the March 1994 benchmark survey amount and
apply equation (A1) to form estimates to December 1997.  Doing so results in a naive estimate of
holdings as of December 1997 (nhi, T) that differs from holdings as given by the benchmark survey
(bhi,T) by an amount, gapi,T:
(A2)
One candidate cause for the gap is errors in the capital flow data.  Assuming that such errors are
larger in months with greater trading activity, we add to each inter-survey month an amount that is
a function of the gap and the proportion of inter-survey trading activity that occurred in that month.
32
That is, we add to month t’s net purchases of country i’s securities an adjustment given by:
(A3)
where periods 1 and T span the entire inter-survey period.  For each country (and each inter-survey
period), everything on the right side of (A3) is given except adjfactori, which we choose to minimize
the distance at time T between benchmark holdings and our adjusted holdings estimates:
(A4)
where our adjusted holdings estimates, hi,t, evolve according to
(A5)31
and, for all t, we impose a non-negativity constraint on our holdings estimates:
(A6)
Because the adjustment for any period t must be part of the revaluation that produces period t+1
holdings (and so on), this is not a simple linear problem and, accordingly, we employ a grid-search
method to solve for the adjustment factor.  
It is worthwhile to note three features of our adjustment factor.  First, it is both country-
specific and inter-survey-period-specific, so a country’s adjustment factor is independent of any
other country’s estimate and can differ across inter-survey periods.  Second,  adjfactori is constant
for a given country and inter-survey period, but the adjustment itself, adji,t, is time-varying.  Third,
for the period after the last survey we cannot form adjustment factors and so apply adjfactori from
the previous inter-survey period; to the extent that the relationship of global financial centers and
capital flows changed after the last benchmark, our estimates that post-date the most recent survey
will incorporate the wrong adjustment factors.
We form estimates for each country starting in December 1976.  For some countries,
however, we do not have complete source data.  For example, the equity price data for the
Philippines starts in 1985.  Where we have no source data, we assume zero (e.g., flat returns).  For
returns, all such cases are indicated by white space in Figure A1. For our performance analysis,
missing data are irrelevant because we bring each country into the analysis at the start date of its
returns data.33 This adjustment is similar to that in the security-level analysis of Grinblatt et al. (1995) and
Badrinath and Wahal (2002), who subtract security j’s return from an expected return for security j, which
is proxied by a 12-month ahead return.  We also compute buy and sell momentum measures by replacing
the return on the total foreign portfolio with a 12-month ahead country return. The results (not shown) are
qualitatively similar.
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Appendix B.  Measures of Momentum Trading
To identify momentum trading strategies, we use the Ferson and Khang (2002) and  Badrinath and
Wahal (2002) refinement of the methodology of Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995).  Define
Xi,t as the active change in the weight of country i in U.S. investors’ foreign portfolio at time t:
(B1)
where ri , t  is the return on country i equities from period t-1 to t; rp, t is the return on U.S. investors’
foreign portfolio, defined as  ; and wi,t is the weight of country i at time t in U.S.
investors’ portfolio.  Note that for a buy-and-hold strategy Xi,t equals zero.  We compute the
following momentum or contrarian measure, LM, for lags of k = 1, 2, and 3:
(B2)
where Nt is the number of countries held in the portfolio at time t.  A significantly positive (negative)
value of LM would constitute evidence of a momentum (contrarian) trading strategy.  
U.S. investors may follow momentum strategies only when buying or selling.  To test this,
we follow Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Badrinath and Wahal (2002) and jointly compute separate
momentum statistics for buy and sell:
(B3)
(B4)
where BM (SM) is a measure of momentum when investors buy (sell) securities.  In order to ensure
that the buy and sell momentum statistics converge to zero under the null hypothesis of no
momentum trading, we subtract total foreign portfolio returns from country returns.
33  We estimate
the momentum measures via generalized method of moments (GMM) for both the overall measure
(B2) and jointly for BM (B3) and SM (B4). 33
Appendix C. Conditional Performance Measures
Conditional returns-based measure
Our implementation of a conditional returns-based performance measure closely follows
Eckbo and Smith (1998).  We assume that the conditional expected excess returns follow a K-factor
equilibrium model (see, for example, Connor and Korajczyk (1995)),
(C1)
where  denotes the mathematical expectation given  , the set of all publicly available
information at time t;   is risk-free interest rate from holding period t to t + 1, which is known at
time t; and  and   are, respectively, the systematic risk exposure of asset i to risk factor
j and the risk premium of factor j, which are both functions of  .  We further assume that the time
variation of systematic risk exposure to the factor (beta) and the factor risk premium follow linear
functions of a smaller set of public information variables, Zt, that is a subset of  .  We use three
variables to proxy for public information: (1) lagged changes in the short-term interest rate (U.S.
Treasury three-month yield), (2) lagged changes in term structure spread (U.S. Treasury 10-year
yield minus U.S. Treasury 3-month yield), and (3) lagged world excess returns.  
Following Ferson and Harvey (1993), Ferson and Korajczyk (1995), and Eckbo and Smith
(1998), equation (C1) can be estimated for U.S. investors’ portfolio, p, with an intercept term, αp.
The performance measure, αp, can be estimated via GMM with the following moment conditions:
(C2)
(C3)
.( C 4 )
The parameters of the model are γ, κ, and αp, where F is vector of K factor returns and rp  is the return
of portfolio p.  Equation (C2) is a K vector of errors from estimating a linear function of factor risk
premiums on information variables.  Equation (C3) is a K vector which can be viewed as errors from
estimates of conditional betas that are linear functions of information variables  , where
.  L is the number of information variables.  Equation (C4)
is the error from estimating a conditional Jensen’s alpha, an average difference between the return
from the portfolio and returns implied from the K-factor model.




The sample moment conditions g are a 2*K*L + 1 vector, and the GMM estimates are obtained by
minimizing the function  , where W is a positive-definite matrix (Hansen (1982)).  We perform
a two-step iterative GMM estimation and use the Newey-West (1987) covariance matrix for W.  
In the conditional returns-based measure, a significantly positive intercept term (the
conditional Jensen’s alpha) would be evidence of superior performance that owed to private
information about future returns beyond what can be exploited from public information.
Conditional portfolio weight-based measure
Our implementation of a conditional weight-based performance measure closely follows
Eckbo and Smith (1998) and Ferson and Khang (2002), who extended the Grinblatt and Titman
(1989, 1993) framework to allow for time-varying expected returns.  Under time-varying expected
returns, an investor would move into (out of) the market when private information indicates a
positive (negative) abnormal return–above an expected return predicted from using public
information.  The estimate of the sum of the conditional covariances is defined as
  (C7)
where   is the benchmark weight of country i at time t.  The benchmark could be any portfolio
weight which we want to measure the performance against; in this paper we use a buy-and-hold
strategy.  The buy-and-hold strategy weight of lag k is defined as
(C8)
This is a general form of a buy-and-hold strategy from the second-term of equation (B1) in the case
of k = 1.  We estimate the conditional portfolio weight-based measure via GMM:
(C9)
(C10)
Equation (C9) is an N vector of errors from estimating a linear function of future excess returns on
information variables when N is the maximum value of Nt for the full sample.  The date at which
each country enters our U.S. portfolio evaluation is depicted in Figure A1.  Each error in equation35
(C9) has an interpretation of an abnormal return.  Equation (C10) is the error from estimating an
average of the conditional covariances between changes in portfolio weights and future abnormal
returns.  φp is the average of conditional weight measure across the full sample. We set up the
following system of moment conditions
(C11)
The vector of sample moment conditions g is a NL+L vector, and the parameters are N vectors of
L by 1 (bi) and a scalar φp .  
The starting date in our large panel of international data varies by country.  MSCI total return
data are available for the full sample for developed markets and from the early 1990's for emerging
markets.  We could estimate the model starting from the date at which we have all country returns
data.  Instead, we exploit all available information by using the whole sample and including an
indicator variable to control for missing values.  Following Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), we define
Ii,t, which indicates variable denoting data availability for a country i at time t, as
(C12)
The key assumption is that Ii,t is independent of the error terms from equations (C9) and (C10),
which implies that data are missing randomly.  This assumption would be violated if, for example,
missing data were all in periods with abnormally high excess returns, which is not likely the case.
The indicator variable will in effect fill in missing values with zeros.  We modify the error term in
equation (C9) by multiplying it with this indicator variable, which in turn will affect equation (C10)
through the modified error term. Our augmented set of moments conditions are
(C13)
Evidence of private information would be a positive estimate of the sum of the conditional
covariances between changes in portfolio weight and future abnormal returns. Notes for Figures 1 and A1
Figures 1a - 1g: Naive estimates are the thin lines; our benchmark-consistent estimates are the thick
lines.
Figure A1: The figure shows the availability (and our use) of data on equity returns.  White space
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U.S. Portfolio Weights 
 
The figure shows the evolution of weights in U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolio for 
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Latin America Emerging Asia Emerging Europe Other Emerging Euro Area Other Europe Other Developed  Figure 3. Selling Behavior and Subsequent Returns 
The chart shows the relationship between U.S. investors’ selling behavior in each 
country, measured by country-level SM measures (x-axis), and subsequent monthly 
returns (y-axis).  If countries recently downweighted in U.S. portfolios subsequently 
underperformed, there would be a mass of observations in the lower left quadrant. 
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 Figure 4. Subsequent Reward-to-Risk Ratios and Initial Portfolio Weights 
The figure plots each country’s reward-to-risk ratio, computed as the mean monthly 
excess return over the standard deviation of excess returns for the period January 1990 – 
December 2001, against the deviation of U.S. investors’ portfolio weights from MSCI 
weights as of December 1989.  In each panel, the mean reward-to-risk is depicted by a 
vertical line. 
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 Figure A1. Data Availability:  Equity Returns














































IFCGThis tables compares the evolution of country weights (expressed in percent) in U.S.investors' foreign with benchmark
weights from the MSCI World ex US index. Data are as of year-end.  Ellipses (…) indicate that the country
was not yet included in MSCI indexes.
MSCI US MSCI US MSCI US
Developed Countries 94.2 94.4 85.7 86.6 90.3 89.4
Euro Area 16.9 24.4 20.1 26.2 31.4 32.2
Austria 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
Belgium/Lux 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8
Finland 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9 2.0 3.6
France 4.3 6.9 5.3 5.4 9.1 7.9
Germany 5.1 4.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 5.1
Ireland 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.7 2.0
Italy 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.5 2.4
Netherlands 2.1 7.3 3.4 8.0 5.0 7.9
Portugal 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Spain 1.4 2.0 1.5 2.2 2.8 2.3
Other Europe 16.0 27.2 22.0 26.2 31.5 32.7
Denmark 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5
Norway 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.6
Sweden 1.5 2.2 1.7 3.3 2.1 1.7
Switzerland 2.4 3.7 5.0 4.6 6.4 5.3
Great Britain 11.3 20.2 14.2 16.9 21.8 24.6
Other Developed 61.3 42.8 43.7 34.1 27.5 24.5
Australia 1.9 2.7 2.2 3.2 3.2 2.6
Canada 3.7 13.1 3.2 6.1 4.5 6.3
Japan 54.2 25.4 34.5 20.1 17.3 12.0
Hong Kong 0.9 0.9 2.6 3.2 1.7 2.1
Singapore 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.4 0.8 1.5
Emerging Markets 5.8 5.6 14.3 13.4 9.7 10.6
Latin America 0.8 2.1 3.4 5.8 2.2 3.6
Argentina 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.1
Brazil 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.5
Chile 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.1
Colombia … 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 0.3 1.4 0.9 2.5 0.9 1.8
Peru … 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Venezuela … 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia 4.8 2.0 8.1 5.5 5.0 4.6
China … 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2
India … 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5
Indonesia 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1
Korea 1.4 0.5 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.1
Malaysia 0.5 0.3 1.8 1.4 0.6 0.2
Pakistan … 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1
Taiwan 2.5 0.1 1.7 0.2 1.4 1.4
Thailand 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.1
Emerging Europe 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.9
Czech … 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
Greece 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Hungary … 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland … 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Russia … 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3
Turkey 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other Emerging 0.0 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.4
Israel … 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.9
South Africa … 0.9 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.5
Memo:
  U.S. Investors' Foreign Equity Portfolio ($ billions) 235 804 1,613
Table 1. Foreign Equity Weights in MSCI and U.S. Investors' Portfolios
2001 1996 1989Table 2
The Performance of U.S. Investors’ Foreign Equity Portfolios
This table reports means, standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios (mean divided by standard deviation) for portfolios
of foreign equities.  Returns are in excess of a one-month Eurodollar interest rate and are expressed in monthly
percentage points.  Value-weighted benchmarks are portfolios based on MSCI market capitalization weights.  U.S.
investors’ portfolios are based on U.S. investors’ holdings.  The Chi-squared: Sharpe Ratio is a test statistic for the
null hypothesis that Sharpe ratios in the two columns are equal.  Panels A-C report statistics for the following
samples: the full sample (January 1977 through December 2001), two subsample periods (January 1977 through
December 1989 and January 1990 through December 2001), and two groups of countries (Developed and Emerging
markets). Asymptotic p-values computed from Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in brackets. *
Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.















Chi-squared: Sharpe Ratio 2.159
[0.142]



























Chi-squared: Sharpe Ratio 4.952*



























Chi-squared: Sharpe Ratio 4.094*
[0.043]Table 3
Momentum Measures for the Foreign Equity Portfolio
The LM statistic is a measure of momentum based on deviations of portfolio weights from a passive buy-and-hold strategy (equation (B1)). The BM statistic is a
measure of momentum based on the positive portfolio weight deviations from a passive buy-and-hold strategy (equation (B3)). The SM statistic is a measure of
momentum based on the negative portfolio weight deviations from a passive buy-and-hold strategy (equation (B4)).  Lag 1, Lag 2, and Lag 3 correspond to the
measure of momentum based on returns lagged 1, 2, and 3 months, respectively. Panel A reports statistics for all countries for the full sample (January 1977
through December 2001) and two subsample periods (January 1977 through December 1989 and January 1990 through December 2001).  Panel B reports
estimates for two groups of countries (Developed and Emerging Markets) for 1990 – 2001.  Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. *
Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
                                                      
Panel A: All Countries 1977-2001 1977-1989 1990-2001
Momentum Measure Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3






















































Panel B: Country Splits,
1990 - 2001
Developed Countries Emerging Markets
Momentum Measure Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3




































Conditional Jensen’s Alpha for U.S. Investors’ Foreign Equity Portfolio
This table reports GMM estimates of conditional Jensen’s alpha, αp, using the following system of equations:
.
where rp,t+1 is the excess return in month t+1 of U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolio, Zt is the set of information variables (including a constant), and Ft+1 is the
set of risk factors.  Three different factor pricing models are used. CAPM represents a one-factor model that includes the excess return on the world market
portfolio. CAPM and HML represents a two-factor model that includes the excess return on the world market portfolio and the difference between returns on
global portfolio of high book-to-market and low book-to-market (HML). CAPM and FX represents a four-factor model that includes the excess return on the world
market portfolio and foreign exchange (FX) risks proxied by excess returns from investing in euro, yen, and sterling interest rates. Chi-sq: Constant β is a test
statistic for the null hypothesis that estimates in vector κ in equation (C3), except the intercept, are jointly insignificant. Chi-sq: Constant Risk Premium is a test
statistic for the null hypothesis that estimates in vector γ in equation (C2), except the intercept, are jointly insignificant. In Panel A, estimates are from the full
sample. Panel B shows estimates for two subsamples: January 1977 through December 1989 and January 1990 through December 2001. Test Equal α is a Chi-
squared test statistic for the null of hypothesis that alpha is equal for the two subsample periods. Panel C reports estimates from the sample from January 1990
through December 2001 for two group of countries: Developed and Emerging markets. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. Asymptotic p-
values computing from Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in brackets. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Panel A: Full Sample (1977 - 2001)
Time-Varying Beta Constant Beta

































[0.000]Panel B: Pre- and post-1990                
Time-Varying Beta Constant Beta
























































[0.093]Panel C: Post-1990 (1990 - 2001)
Time-Varying Beta Constant Beta


































































[0.933]Table 5: Conditional Portfolio Weight Performance Measure for U.S. Investors’ Foreign Equity Portfolio
This table reports GMM estimates of φp for the following system:
where ri,t+1 is the vector of portfolio excess returns in month t+1 , bi is the matrix of coefficients from regressing ri,t+1 on the instruments, Zt (including a constant),
and the parameter  φp is the average conditional covariance.  In Panel A, estimates are from the full sample. Panel B shows estimates for two subsamples: January
1977 through December 1989 and January 1990 through December 2001. Test Equal φ is a Chi-squared test statistic for the null of hypothesis that φp is equal in
the two subsample periods. Panel C reports estimates from the sample from January 1990 through December 2001 for two group of countries: Developed and
Emerging. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. Asymptotic p-values computing from Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in
brackets. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Panel A: Full Sample (1977 - 2001)









































Longer-term Allocation of U.S. Investors
This table reports means, standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios (mean divided by standard deviation) for the period
January 1990 through December 2001. Returns are in excess of a one-month Eurodollar interest rate and are
expressed in monthly percentage points.  Weights in the value-weighted foreign benchmark portfolios are based on
MSCI market capitalizations (column a). Weights in the U.S. investors’ foreign equity portfolios are based on actual
U.S. investor holdings (column b); based on holdings computed from imposing the highest intra-month for buying and
the lowest intra-month for selling (column c); based on holdings that were in December 1989 (column d); based on
actual holdings that were in December 1989 (from January 1990 through December 1995) and based on actual
holdings that were in December 1995 (from January 1996 through December 2000) (column e). The Chi-squared:
Sharpe Ratio is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that Sharpe ratio in that column is equal to the Sharpe ratio in
column (a).  Asymptotic p-values computed from Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in brackets. *
Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Value-Weighted
Foreign Benchmarks
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Chi-squared: Sharpe Ratio 4.094*
[0.043]
3.947*
[0.047]
5.656*
[0.017]
5.870*
[0.015]